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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Monday
5 October 1981

Top Secret

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POLAND: Moderates Gain Time	
The compromise resolution on workers' self-management endorsed by Solidarity's congress is a tactical victory for union moderates that allows time for further negotiation of differences between the government and the union.	1
There apparently was little support for a militant proposal flatly rejecting the law, which was passed by parliament on 25 September. Instead, the delegates directed the new union leadership to organize a referendum on objectionable parts of the law in what seems to be an effort to bring about amendments or to ensure implementation on favorable terms.	
Solidarity leaders evidently will have some latitude in carrying out this directive; no deadline for a referendum was set. They also can use the threat of the referendum to bring pressure on the regime as the two sides negotiate the vague areas of the legislation especially the issue regarding which directors will be chosen by workers' councils.	<b>X</b> 1
The government's announcement of price increases for a small number of consumer goodseffective todayhas angered many delegates and prompted Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to send a telegram to Premier Jaruzelski demanding their recision. In a conciliatory gesture to the newly reelected union leader, Jaruzelski quickly dispatched two ministers to Gdansk to consult with Solidarity. The ministers' justifications for the price hikes were rejected during a heated session, and Walesa again demanded recision of the price hikes.	<b>X</b> 1
The Solidarity leadership is interpreting a recent letter from the head of the Hungarian trade union organization offering to "discuss and debate" the role of unions as a hopeful sign that Solidarity can find some common ground with other East European unions. The Hungarian message—which declined Solidarity's invitation to its congress because of its "antisocialist, anti—Soviet" platform—is the first offer of a dialogue by any regime—controlled trade union in Eastern Europe. Hungarian motives are unclear—the message may be nothing more than rhetoric—but the action presumably will not please  25X1  Moscow.	
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Moscow has not initiated any significations in its public commentary on the condays, although it is sustaining its critical Soviets are keeping pressure on Warsaw by calls for firmer government action from Polish party and populace. They are consecutive in the Solidarity leadership pointing to "positive" voices being raise at Gdansk.	ngress in recical line. ' y citing concelements in the citing to a concele but are also but are also as a concele but are also as a concele but are also as a concele but are also also are also	cent The tinued the ttack
The Soviets have reported, but not of Walesa's reelection. Unless some particular tive anti-Soviet statements are made at of is likely to withhold a more definitive its future course until after the congressently will continue at least until tomore	llarly provocationsk, Mosco indication of ss, which app	ca- ow f
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YUGOSLAVIA: Leadership Changes

The resignation from the party presidium last week of a longtime Tito confidant is the most significant leadership change since Tito's death and probably opens the door to similar personnel changes. Before Petar Stambolic resigned on Thursday, the leadership had been reluctant to reinvigorate the 23-man presidium that existed when Tito died. Stambolic was one of only three in the leadership who held positions in both the top state and the party bodies. His replacement suggests that the double incumbencies of Kosovo's Fadilj Hodza and Croatia's Vladimir Bakaric also may end soon.

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The appointment of Dragoslav Markovic, head of the Federal Assembly, to replace Stambolic tends to strengthen Serb nationalist forces in the party leadership. Markovic has been in the lead in Serbia's drive to increase its authority over the troubled Kosovo Province; he has been at odds with another Serb leader, Milos Minic, who believes such efforts risk inflaming Serb nationalism. Minic, however, has no independent power base in Serbia and is not likely to find much support for his more moderate views.

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
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ZIMBABWE-USSR: Holding Relations to a Minimum	
President Mugabe continues to block Moscow's efforts to improve relations beyond the establishment of diplomatic ties, begun last February. A Soviet offer to open economic assistance talks has been rebuffed. Salisbury has responded favorably only to an offer of scholarships for technical studies in the USSR.	25X1
Moscow also has not been able to persuade Salisbury	_
to establish a diplomatic presence in the USSR.	25X1
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